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Recent experimental studies and theoretical models have begun to address the challenge of establishing
a causal link between subjective conscious experience and measurable neuronal activity. The present
review focuses on the well-delimited issue of how an external or internal piece of information goes
beyond nonconscious processing and gains access to conscious processing, a transition characterized
by the existence of a reportable subjective experience. Converging neuroimaging and neurophysiological
data, acquired during minimal experimental contrasts between conscious and nonconscious processing,
point to objective neural measures of conscious access: late amplification of relevant sensory activity,
long-distance cortico-cortical synchronization at beta and gamma frequencies, and ‘‘ignition’’ of
a large-scale prefronto-parietal network. We compare these findings to current theoretical models of
conscious processing, including the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) model according to which
conscious access occurs when incoming information is made globally available to multiple brain systems
through a network of neurons with long-range axons densely distributed in prefrontal, parieto-temporal,
and cingulate cortices. The clinical implications of these results for general anesthesia, coma, vegetative
state, and schizophrenia are discussed.Introduction
Understanding the neuronal architectures that give rise to
conscious experience is one of the central unsolved problems
of today’s neuroscience, despite its major clinical implications
for general anesthesia, coma, vegetative-state, or minimally
conscious patients. The difficulties are numerous. Notably, the
term ‘‘consciousness’’ has multiple meanings, most of which
are difficult to precisely define in a manner amenable to experi-
mentation. In this review, we outline recent advances made in
understanding the delimited issue of conscious access: how
does an external or internal piece of information gain access
to conscious processing, defined as a reportable subjective
experience?
We start with a brief overview of the relevant vocabulary and
theoretical concepts. We then examine the experimental studies
that have attempted to delineate the objective physiological
mechanisms of conscious sensory perception by contrasting it
with minimally different, yet nonconscious processing condi-
tions, using a variety of methods: behavior, neuroimaging,
time-resolved electro- and magneto-encephalography, and
finally single-cell electrophysiology and pharmacology. We crit-
ically examine how the present evidence fits or argues against
existing models of conscious processing, including the Global
Neuronal Workspace (GNW) model. We end by examining
possible consequences of these advances for pathological brain
states, including general anesthesia, coma, and vegetative
states.200 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.I. Vocabulary and Major Experimental Paradigms
Conscious State versus Conscious Contents
‘‘Conscious’’ is an ambiguous word. In its intransitive use (e.g.,
‘‘the patient was still conscious’’), it refers to the state of
consciousness, also called wakefulness or vigilance, which is
thought to vary almost continuously from coma and slow-wave
sleep to full vigilance. In its transitive use (e.g., ‘‘I was not
conscious of the red light’’), it refers to conscious access to
and/or conscious processing of a specific piece of information.
The latter meaning is the primary focus of this review. At any
given moment, only a limited amount of information is
consciously accessed and defines the current conscious
content, which is reportable verbally or by an intended gesture.
At the same time, many other processing streams co-occur
but remain nonconscious.
Major Experimental Paradigms
A broad variety of paradigms (reviewed in Kim and Blake, 2005)
are now available to create a minimal contrast between
conscious and nonconscious stimuli (Baars, 1989) and thus
isolate the moment and the physiological properties of
conscious access. A basic distinction is whether the noncon-
scious stimulus is subliminal or preconscious (Dehaene et al.,
2006; Kanai et al., 2010). A subliminal stimulus is one in which
the bottom-up, stimulus-driven information is so reduced as to
make it undetectable, even with focused attention. A precon-
scious stimulus, by contrast, is one that is potentially visible (its
energy and duration are such that it could be seen), but which,
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distraction or inattention.
Subliminal presentation is often achieved by masking,
a method whereby the subjective visibility of a stimulus is
reduced or eliminated by the presentation, in close spatial and
temporal contiguity, of other stimuli acting as ‘‘masks’’ (Breit-
meyer, 2006). For instance, a word flashed for 33 ms is visible
when presented in isolation but becomes fully invisible when
preceded and followed by geometrical shapes. Masked stimuli
are frequently used to induce subliminal priming, the facilitation
of the processing of a visible target by the prior presentation of
an identical or related subliminal prime (for review, see Kouider
and Dehaene, 2007). Subliminal presentation can also be
achieved with threshold stimuli, where the contrast or energy
of a stimulus is progressively reduced until its presence is unno-
ticeable. Binocular rivalry is another common paradigm whereby
the image in one eye becomes subliminal by competition with
a rivaling image presented in the other eye. Participants typically
report temporal alternations in the image that is consciously
perceived. However, a variant of binocular rivalry, the continuous
flash suppression paradigm allows an image to be made perma-
nently invisible by presenting continuously flashing shapes in the
other eye (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005).
An equally large range of techniques allows for preconscious
presentation. In inattentional blindness, a potentially visible but
unexpected stimulus remains unreported when the participants’
attention is focused on another task (Mack and Rock, 1998;
Simons and Ambinder, 2005). The attentional blink (AB) is
a short-term variant of this effect where a brief distraction by
a first stimulus T1 prevents the conscious perception of a second
stimulus T2 briefly presented within a few hundreds of millisec-
onds of T1 (Raymond et al., 1992). In the related psychological
refractory period (PRP) effect (Pashler, 1994; Welford, 1952),
T2 is unmasked and is therefore eventually perceived and pro-
cessed, but only after a delay during which it remains noncon-
scious (Corallo et al., 2008; Marti et al., 2010). The ‘‘distracting’’
event T1 can be a surprise event that merely captures attention
(Asplund et al., 2010). The minimum requirement, in order to
induce AB, appears to be that T1 is consciously perceived
(Nieuwenstein et al., 2009). Thus, PRP and AB are closely related
phenomena that point to a serial limit or ‘‘bottleneck’’ in con-
scous access (Jolicoeur, 1999; Marti et al., 2010; Wong, 2002)
and can be used to contrast the neural fate of two identical
stimuli, only one of which is consciously perceived (Sergent
et al., 2005).
Objective versus Subjective Criteria for Conscious
Access
How can an experimenter decide whether his experimental
subject was or was not conscious of a stimulus? According to
a long psychophysical tradition, grounded in signal-detection
theory, a stimulus should be accepted as nonconscious only if
subjects are unable to perform above chance on some direct
task of stimulus detection or classification. This strict objective
criterion raises problems, however (Persaud et al., 2007;
Schurger and Sher, 2008). First, it tends to overestimate
conscious perception: there are many conditions in which
subjects perform better than chance, yet still deny perceiving
the stimulus. Second, performance can be at chance level forsome tasks, but not others, raising the issue of which tasks count
as evidence of conscious perception or merely of subliminal pro-
cessing. Third, the approach requires accepting the null hypoth-
esis of chance-level performance, yet performance never really
falls down to zero, and whether it is significant or not often
depends on arbitrary choices such as the number of trials dedi-
cated to its measurement.
For these reasons, recent alternative approaches emphasize
either pure subjective reports, suchas ratingsof stimulus visibility
(Sergent and Dehaene, 2004), or second-order commentaries
such as postdecision wagering (e.g., would you bet that your
response was correct?; Persaud et al., 2007). The wagering
method and related confidence judgements provide a high moti-
vation to respond truthfully and in an unbiasedmanner (Schurger
and Sher, 2008). Furthemore, they can be adapted to nonhuman
subjects (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Terrace and Son, 2009).
However, they can sometimes exceed chance level even when
subjects deny seeing the stimulus (Kanai et al., 2010).
Conversely, subjective report is arguably the primary data of
interest in consciousness research. Furthermore, reports of stim-
ulus visibility canbefinely quantified, leading to thediscovery that
conscious perception can be ‘‘all-or-none’’ in some paradigms
(Del Cul et al., 2007; Del Cul et al., 2006; Sergent and Dehaene,
2004). Subjective reports also present the advantage of assess-
ing conscious access immediately andon every trial, thus permit-
ting postexperiment sorting of conscious versus nonconscious
trials with identical stimuli (e.g., Del Cul et al., 2007; Lamy et al.,
2009; Pins and Ffytche, 2003; Sergent et al., 2005; Wyart and
Tallon-Baudry, 2008).
Although the debate about optimal measures of conscious
perception continues, it is important to acknowledge that objec-
tive assessments, wagering indices and subjective reports are
generally in excellent agreement (Del Cul et al., 2006; Del Cul
et al., 2009; Persaud et al., 2007). For instance, in visual masking,
the conscious perception thresholds derived from objective and
subjective data are essentially identical across subjects (r2 =
0.96, slope z 1) (Del Cul et al., 2006). Those data suggest that
conscious access causes a major change in the global avail-
ability of information, whether queried by objective or by subjec-
tivemeans, whosemechanism is the focus of the present review.
Selective Attention versus Conscious Access
Conscious access must be distinguished from the related
concept of attention. William James (1890) provided a well-
known definition of attention as ‘‘the taking possession by the
mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.’’ The
problem with this definition is that it conflates two processes
that arenowclearly separated incognitivepsychologyandcogni-
tive neuroscience (e.g., Huang, 2010; Posner and Dehaene,
1994): selection and access. Selection, also called selective
attention, refers to the separation of relevant versus irrelevant
information, isolation of an object or spatial location, based on
its saliency or relevance to current goals, and amplification of
its sensory attributes. Access refers to its conscious ‘‘taking
possession of the mind’’—the subject of the present review.
Empirical evidence indicates that selection can occur without
conscious processing (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007). For instance,
selective spatial attention can be attracted to the location ofNeuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 201
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2008; McCormick, 1997; Robitaille and Jolicoeur, 2006;
Woodman and Luck, 2003). Selective attention can also amplify
the processing of stimuli that remain nonconscious (Kentridge
et al., 2008; Kiefer and Brendel, 2006; Naccache et al., 2002).
Finally, in simple displays with a single target, conscious access
can occur independently of selection (Wyart and Tallon-Baudry,
2008). In cluttered displays, however, selection appears to be
a prerequisite of conscious access: when faced with several
competing stimuli, we need attentional selection in order to
gain conscious access to just one of them (Dehaene and Nacc-
ache, 2001; Mack and Rock, 1998). These findings indicate that
selective attention and conscious access are related but disso-
ciable concepts that should be carefully separated, attention
frequently serving as a ‘‘gateway’’ that regulates which informa-
tion reaches conscious processing.
II. Experimental Studies of the Brain Mechanisms
of Conscious Access
With this vocabulary at hand, we turn to empirical studies of
conscious access. The simplest experiments consist in present-
ing a brief sensory stimulus that is sometimes consciously acces-
sible, sometimes not, and using behavior, neuroimaging, and
neurophysiological recording tomonitor the depth of its process-
ing and how it differs as a function of conscious reportability.
Experiments Contrasting Visible and Invisible Stimuli
Behavioral evidence. A visual stimulus that is masked and
remains invisible can nevertheless affect behavior and brain
activity at multiple levels (for review, see Kouider and Dehaene,
2007; Van den Bussche et al., 2009b). Subliminal priming has
now been convincingly demonstrated at visual, semantic, and
even motor levels. For instance, when a visible target image is
preceded by a subliminal presentation of the same image, simple
decisions, such as judging whether it refers to an object or
animal, are accelerated compared to when the image is not
repeated. Crucially, this repetition effect resists major changes
in the physical stimulus, such as presenting the same word in
upper case versus lower case (Dehaene et al., 2001) or present-
ing the same face in two different orientations (Kouider et al.,
2009), suggesting that invariant visual recognition can be
achieved without awareness. At the semantic level, subliminal
extraction of the meaning of words has now been demonstrated
for a variety of word categories (e.g., Gaillard et al., 2006; Nacc-
ache and Dehaene, 2001; Van den Bussche et al., 2009a). At
evenmore advanced levels, a subliminal stimulus can biasmotor
responses (Dehaene et al., 1998b; Leuthold and Kopp, 1998).
Subliminal monetary incentives enhance subjects’ motivation
in a demanding force task, indicating that motivation is modu-
lated by nonconscious signals (Pessiglione et al., 2007). So is
task setting: masked shapes can act as cues for task switching
and lead to detectable changes in task set (Lau and Passingham,
2007). Even inhibitory control can be partially launched noncon-
sciously, as when a nonconscious ‘‘stop’’ signal slows down or
interrupts motor responses (van Gaal et al., 2008) (see Figure 1).
The above list suggests that entire chains of specialized
processors can be subject to nonconscious influences. Never-
theless, three potential limits to subliminal processing have
been identified (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). First, subliminal202 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.priming quickly decreases with processing depth, such that only
small influences are detectable at higher cognitive and decision
levels (Dehaene, 2008; van Gaal et al., 2008). For instance,
a subliminal number can enter into a single numerical operation,
but not a series of two arbitrary operations (Sackur andDehaene,
2009). Second, subliminal priming decreases with elapsed time,
and therefore typically ceases to be detectable after 500 ms
(Dupoux et al., 2008; Greenwald et al., 1996; Mattler, 2005).
For instance, classical conditioning across a temporal gap only
obtains when participants report being aware of the relations
among the stimuli (Clark et al., 2002) (although see Bekinschtein
et al., 2009b). Third, subliminal stimuli typically fail to yield lasting
and flexible modifications in executive control. Human subjects
generally excel in identifying strategies that exploit virtually any
statistical relation among stimuli, but such strategic control
appears to require consciousness (Posner et al., 1975/2004)
and is not deployed when the stimuli are masked or unattended
and therefore are not consciously detected (Heinemann et al.,
2009; Kinoshita et al., 2008; Merikle and Joordens, 1997; Van
den Bussche et al., 2008). For instance, under conscious condi-
tions, subjects typically slow down after a conflict or error trial
but may not do so when the error or conflict is nonconscious
(Kunde, 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001) (for two interesting
exceptions, see Logan and Crump, 2010; van Gaal et al., 2010).
Brain-scale neuroimaging. Functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) can provide a global image of the brain activity
evoked by a visible or invisible stimulus, integrated over a few
seconds. Grill-Spector et al. (2000) first used fMRI to measure
visual activity evoked by masked pictures presented below or
above the visibility threshold. Activation of the primary visual
area V1 was largely unaffected by masking, but the amount of
activation in more anterior regions of lateral occipital and fusi-
form cortex strong correlated with perceptual reports. A year
later (Dehaene et al., 2001), a similar contrast between masked
and unmasked words, now at the whole-brain level, again re-
vealed a strong correlation of conscious perception with fusiform
activity, but also demonstrated extended areas of activation
uniquely evoked by conscious words, including inferior pre-
frontal, mesial frontal, and parietal sites (Figure 1). In more recent
fMRI work, using a masking paradigm where conscious reports
followed a characteristic U-shaped curve as a function of the
target-mask delay, fusiform and midline prefrontal and inferior
parietal regions again closely tracked conscious perception
(Haynes et al., 2005b). An important control was recently added:
participants’ objective performance could be equated while
subjective visibility was manipulated (Lau and Passingham,
2006). In this case, a correlate of visibility could only be detected
in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
Some authors have found correlations of fMRI activation with
visibility of masked versus unmasked stimuli exclusively in
posterior visual areas (e.g., Tse et al., 2005). However, in their
paradigm, even the unmasked stimuli were probably not seen
because they were unattended and irrelevant, which can prevent
conscious access (Dehaene et al., 2006; Kouider et al., 2007;
Mack and Rock, 1998). Overall, fMRI evidence suggests two
convergent correlates of conscious access: (1) amplification of
activity in visual cortex, clearest in higher-visual areas such as
the fusiform gyrus, but possibly including earlier visual areas
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Figure 1. fMRI Measures of Conscious
Access
(A) An early fMRI experiment contrasting the fMRI
activations evoked by brief presentations of words
that were either readable (left) or made invisible by
masking (right) (adapted fromDehaene et al., 2001).
Nonconscious word processing activated the left
occipito-temporal visual word form area, but
conscious perception was characterized by (a) an
intense amplification of activation in relevant
nonconscious processors, here the visual word
form area (left occipito-temporal cortex; see middle
graph); (b) an additional spread of activation to
a distributed, though restricted set of associative
cortices including inferior parietal, prefrontal, and
cingulate areas.
(B) fMRI study of threshold-level noises, approxi-
mately half of which were consciously detected
(Sadaghiani et al., 2009). Bilateral auditory areas
showed a nonconscious activation, which was
amplified and spread to distributed inferior parietal,
prefrontal, and cingulate areas (for similar results
with tactile stimuli, see Boly et al., 2007).
(C) fMRI study of inhibitory control by a visible or
invisible cue (van Gaal et al., 2011). Subjects were
presented with masked visual shapes, at the
threshold for conscious perception, some of which
occasionally required inhibiting a response (go/
no-go task). Small activations to the nonconscious
no-go signal were detected in the inferior frontal
and preSMA cortices, but inhibitory control by
a conscious no-go signal was associated with fMRI
signal amplification (see the difference between no-
go and go signals in middle graphs), and massive
spread of the activation to additional and more
anterior areas including prefrontal, anterior cingu-
late, and inferior parietal cortices.
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2008); (2) emergence of a correlated distributed set of areas,
virtually always including bilateral parietal and prefrontal cortices
(see Figure 1).
Time-resolved imaging methods. Event-related potentials
(ERPs) and magneto-encephalography (MEG) are noninvasive
methods for monitoring at a millisecond scale, respectively, the
electrical and magnetic fields evoked by cortical and subcortical
sources in the human brain. Both techniques have been used to
track the processing of amasked stimulus in time as it crosses or
does not cross the threshold for subjective report. In the 1960sNeuronalready, ERP studies showed that early
visual activation can be fully preserved
during masking (Schiller and Chorover,
1966). This early finding has been sup-
ported by animal electrophysiology
(Bridgeman, 1975, 1988; Kova´cs et al.,
1995; Lamme et al., 2002; Rolls et al.,
1999) and by essentially all recent ERP
and MEG studies (Dehaene et al., 2001;
Del Cul et al., 2007; Fahrenfort et al.,
2007; Koivisto et al., 2006, 2009; Lamy
et al., 2009; Melloni et al., 2007; Railo
and Koivisto, 2009; van Aalderen-Smeets
et al., 2006). Evidence from the attentional
blink also confirms that the first 200 ms ofinitial visual processing can be fully preserved on trials in which
subjects deny seeing a stimulus (Sergent et al., 2005; Vogel
et al., 1998) (see Figure 2).
In ERPs, the most consistent correlate of visibility appears to
be a late (300–500ms) and broadly distributed positive compo-
nent called P3 or sometimes P3b (to distinguish it from the focal
anterior P3a, which is thought to reflect automatic attention
attraction and can occur nonconsciously [e.g., Muller-Gass
et al., 2007; Salisbury et al., 1992]). A similarly slow and late
waveform is seen in MEG (van Aalderen-Smeets et al., 2006).
The generators of the P3b ERP have been shown by intracranial70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 203
Figure 2. Electro- and Magneto-encephalography Measures of Conscious Access
(A) Time course of scalp event-related potentials evoked by an identical visual stimulus, presented during the attentional blink, as a function of whether it was
reported as seen or unseen (Sergent et al., 2005). Early events (P1 and N1) were strictly identical, but the N2 event was amplified and the P3 events (P3a and P3b)
were present essentially only during conscious perception.
(B) Manipulation of visibility by varying the temporal asynchrony between a visual stimulus and a subsequent mask (Del Cul et al., 2007). A nonlinearity, defining
a threshold value for conscious access, was seen in both subjective visibility reports and the P3b event amplitude. Source modeling related this P3b to a sudden
nonlinear ignition, about 300 ms after stimulus presentation, of distributed sources including inferior prefrontal cortex, with a simultaneous reactivation of early
visual areas. Note the two-stage pattern of fusiform activation, with an early linear activation followed by a late nonlinear ignition.
(C) Magneto-encephalography correlates of the attentional blink (Gross et al., 2004). On perceived trials, induced power and phase synchrony increased in the
low beta band (13–18 Hz), in a broad network dominated by right inferior parietal and left prefrontal sites.
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uted set of nearly simultaneous active areas including hippo-
campus and temporal, parietal, and frontal association cortices
(Halgren et al., 1998; Mantini et al., 2009). The P3b has been
reproducibly observed as strongly correlated with subjective
reports, both when varying stimulus parameters (e.g., Del Cul
et al., 2007) and when comparing identical trials with or without
conscious perception (e.g., Babiloni et al., 2006; Del Cul et al.,
2007; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2003; Koivisto et al., 2008;
Lamy et al., 2009; Niedeggen et al., 2001; Pins and Ffytche,
2003; Sergent et al., 2005) (however, this effect may disappear
when the subject already has a conscious working memory
representation of the target: Melloni et al., 2011). The effect is
not easily imputable to increased postperceptual processing or
other task confounds, as many studies equated attention and
response requirements on conscious and nonconscious trials
(e.g., Del Cul et al., 2007; Gaillard et al., 2009; Lamy et al.,
2009; Sergent et al., 2005). For instance, Lamy et al. (2009)204 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.compared correct aware versus correct unaware trials in
a forced-choice localization task on a masked stimulus, thus
equating for stimuli and responses, and again observed a tight
correlation with the P3b component.
Human ERP andMEG recordings also revealed that conscious
perception is also accompanied, during a similar timewindow, by
increases in the power of high-frequency fluctuations, primarily in
the gamma band (>30 Hz), as well as their phase synchronization
across distant cortical sites (Doesburg et al., 2009; Melloni et al.,
2007; Rodriguez et al., 1999; Schurger et al., 2006; Wyart and
Tallon-Baudry, 2009). In lower frequencies belonging to the alpha
and low beta bands (10–20 Hz), the data aremore ambiguous, as
both power increases (Gross et al., 2004) anddecreases (Gaillard
et al., 2009;Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009) have been reported,
perhaps due to paradigm-dependent variability in the deploy-
ment of dorsal parietal attention networks associated with
decreases in alpha-band power (Sadaghiani et al., 2010). Even
when power decreases in these low frequencies, however, their
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Figure 3. Intracranial Potentials during Conscious Access
Intracranial local-field potentials were recorded during stimulation with masked or unmasked words from a total of ten patients implanted with deep intracortical
electrodes (Gaillard et al., 2009). Four intracranial signatures of conscious access were identified.
(A) Although invisible words elicited event-related potentials, mostly early (<300 ms) and at posterior sites, only visible words elicited massive and durable
voltages in a late time window, particularly from the few available frontal electrodes.
(B) Gamma-band power increases were detectable for invisible words, but in a late time window (>300 ms) gamma power was massively amplified when the
words were visible, particularly in the high-gamma range (50–100 Hz). Reduced power was seen in the alpha and lower beta bands.
(C) Phase synchrony increased for invisible words in a late time window (300–500 ms) in the beta frequency range (13–30 Hz).
(D) Causal relations across distant electrodes, assessed by Granger causality gain due to word presence, increasedmassively during the same timewindow. The
bottom row shows causal gain for a particular electrode pair as a function of time. Increases were bidirectional but dominant in the bottom-up direction (e.g.,
occipital-to-frontal), compatible with the idea of posterior information ‘‘accessing’’ more anterior sites. All time scales are relative to stimulus onset.
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conscious perception (Gaillard et al., 2009; Gross et al., 2004;
see also Hipp et al., 2011). The globally distributed character of
these power and synchrony increases seems essential, because
recent results indicate that localized increases in these parame-
ters can be evoked by nonconscious stimuli, particularly during
the first 200msof stimulus processing (Fisch et al., 2009;Gaillard
et al., 2009;Melloni et al., 2007). Thus, short-lived focal increases
in gamma-band power are not unique to conscious states but
track activation of both conscious and nonconscious local
cortical circuits (Ray and Maunsell, 2010). However, their signifi-
cant enhancement on consciously perceived trials, turning into
an all-or-none pattern after 200 ms, appears as a potentially
more specific marker of conscious access (Fisch et al., 2009;
Gaillard et al., 2009).
The high spatial precision and signal-to-noise ratio afforded by
intracranial recording in epileptic patients provides essentialdata on this point. Gaillard et al. (2009) contrasted the fate of
masked (subliminal) versus unmasked (conscious) words while
recording from a total of 176 local sites using intracortical depth
electrodes in ten epileptic patients. Four objective signatures of
conscious perception were identified (Figure 3): (1) late (>300ms)
and distributed event-related potentials contacting sites in
prefrontal cortex; (2) large and late (>300 ms) increases in
induced power (indexing local synchrony) in high-gamma
frequencies (50–100 Hz), accompanied by a decrease in lower-
frequency power (centered around 10 Hz); (3) increases in
long-distance cortico-cortical synchrony in the beta frequency
band 13–30 Hz; (4) increases in causal relations among distant
cortical areas, bidirectionally but more strongly in the bottom-
up direction (as assessed byGranger causality, a statistical tech-
nique that measures whether the time course of signals at one
site can forecast the future evolution of signals at another distant
site). Gaillard et al. (2009) noted that all four signatures coincidedNeuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 205
Figure 4. Human Single-Cell Recordings
during Conscious Access
Single cells were recorded from the human medial
temporal lobe and hippocampus during presen-
tation of masked pictures, with a variable target-
mask delay (Quiroga et al., 2008). The example at
left shows a single cell that fired specifically to
pictures of theWorld Trade Center, and did so only
on trials when the patient recognized the picture
(dark blue raster plots), not on trials when recog-
nition failed (red raster plots). Graphs at right show
the average firing rate across all neurons. Although
a small transient firing could be seen on unrec-
ognized trials, conscious perception was charac-
terized by a massive and durable amplification of
activity (for complementary results using electro-
corticography (ECoG) in human occipito-temporal
areas, see also Fisch et al., 2009).
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might constitute different measures of the same state of distrib-
uted ‘‘ignition’’ of a large cortical network including prefrontal
cortex. Indeed, seen stimuli had a global impact on late evoked
activity virtually anywhere in the cortex: 68.8%of electrode sites,
although selected for clinical purposes, were modulated by the
presence of conscious words (as opposed to 24.4% of sites
for nonconscious words).
Neuronal recordings. A pioneering research programwas con-
ducted by Logothetis and collaborators using monkeys trained
to report their perception during binocular rivalry (Leopold and
Logothetis, 1996; Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997; Wilke et al.,
2006). By recording from V1, V2, V4, MT, MST, IT, and STS
neurons and presenting two rivaling images, only one of which
led to high neural firing, they identified a fraction of cells whose
firing rate increased when their preferred stimuli was perceived,
thus participating in a conscious neuronal assembly. The propor-
tion of such cells increased from about 20% in V1/V2 to 40% in
V4, MT, or MST to as high as 90% in IT and STS. This finding
supports the hypothesis that subjective perception is associated
with distributed cell assemblies whose neurons are denser in
higher associative cortices than in primary and secondary visual
cortices. Surprisingly, fMRI signals correlated quite strongly with
conscious perception during rivalry in area V1 (Haynes andRees,
2005; Polonsky et al., 2000) and even in the lateral geniculate
nucleus of the thalamus (Haynes et al., 2005a; Wunderlich
et al., 2005). The discrepancy between fMRI and single-cell
recordings was addressed in a recent electrophysiological study
(Maier et al., 2008; see also Wilke et al., 2006): within area V1 of
the same monkeys, fMRI signals and low-frequency (5–30 Hz)
local field potentials (LFPs) correlated with subjective visibility
while high-frequency (30–90 Hz) LFPs and single-cell firing rate
did not. One interpretation of this finding is that V1 neurons
receive additional top-down synaptic signals during conscious
perception compared to nonconscious perception, although
these signals need not be translated into changes in average
firing rate (Maier et al., 2008).206 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.The masking paradigm afforded
a more precise measurement of the
timing of conscious information progres-sion in the visual system. In area V1, multiunit recordings during
both threshold judgments (Supe`r et al., 2001) and masking para-
digms (Lamme et al., 2002) identified two successive response
periods. The first period was phasic, was time-locked to stimulus
onset, and reflected objective properties such as stimulus orien-
tation, whether or not they were detectable by the animal. The
second period was associated with a late, slow, and long-lasting
amplification of firing rate, called figure-ground modulation
because it was specific to neurons whose receptive field fell on
the foreground ‘‘figure’’ part of the stimulus. Crucially, only this
second phase of late amplification correlated tightly with stim-
ulus detectability in awake animals (Lamme et al., 2002; Supe`r
et al., 2001) and vanished under anesthesia (Lamme et al.,
1998). Thus, although different forms of masking can affect
both initial and late neural responses (Macknik and Haglund,
1999; Macknik and Livingstone, 1998), the work of Lamme and
colleagues suggests that it is the late sustained phase that is
most systematically correlated with conscious visibility. A similar
conclusion was reached from earlier recordings in infero-
temporal cortex (Kova´cs et al., 1995; Rolls et al., 1999) and
frontal eye fields (Thompson and Schall, 1999, 2000).
Only a single study to date has explored single-neuron
responses to seen or unseen stimuli in human cortex (Quiroga
et al., 2008). Pictures followed at a variable delay by a mask
were presented while recording from the antero-medial temporal
lobe in five patients with epilepsy. A very late responsewas seen,
peaking around 300 ms and extending further in time. This late
firing reflected tightly the person’s subjective report, to such an
extent that individual trials reported as seen or unseen could
be categorically distinguished by the neuron’s firing train (see
Figure 4). Such a late categorical response is consistent with
the hypothesis that conscious access is ‘‘all-or-none,’’ leading
either to a high degree of reverberation in higher association
cortex (conscious trial) or to a vanishing response (Dehaene
et al., 2003b; Sergent et al., 2005; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004).
Single-cell electrophysiology has also contributed to a better
description of the postulated role of synchrony in conscious
Neuron
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a single area such as V4, the degree to which single neurons
synchronize with the ongoing fluctuations in local-field potential
is a predictor of stimulus detection (Womelsdorf et al., 2006).
Across distant areas such as FEF and V4 (Gregoriou et al.,
2009) or PFC and LIP (Buschman and Miller, 2007), synchrony
is enhanced when the stimulus in the receptive field is attended
and is thus presumably accessed consciously. Consistent with
human MEG and intracranial studies (e.g., Gaillard et al., 2009;
Gross et al., 2004), synchronization involves both gamma and
beta bands, the latter being particularly enhanced during top-
down attention (Buschman and Miller, 2007). During the late
phase of attention-driven activity, causal relations between
distant areas are durably enhanced in both directions, but
more strongly so in the bottom-up direction from V4 to FEF (Gre-
goriou et al., 2009), again similar to human findings (Gaillard
et al., 2009) and compatible with the idea that sensory informa-
tion needs to be propagated anteriorily, particularly to PFC,
before becoming consciously reportable.
Experiments with Perceived and Unperceived Stimuli
outside the Visual Modality
Although vision remains the dominant paradigm, remarkably
similar signatures of conscious access have been obtained in
other sensory or motor modalities (see Figure 1).
In the tactile modality, threshold-level stimuli were studied
both in humans with fMRI and magneto-encephalography
(Boly et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2007) and in awake monkeys
with single-cell electrophysiology (de Lafuente and Romo,
2005, 2006). In the monkey, the early activity of neurons in the
primary somatosensory area S1 was identical on detected and
undetected trials, but within 180 ms the activation expanded
into parietal and medial frontal cortices (MFC) where it showed
a large difference predictive of behavioral reports (high activation
on detected trials and low activity on undetected trials, even for
constant stimuli). In humans, a similar two-phase pattern was
identified within area S1 (Jones et al., 2007). According to the
authors, modeling of these S1 potentials required the postulation
of a late top-down input from unknown distant areas to supra-
granular and granular layers, specific to detected stimuli. Thus,
as in the visual modality (Del Cul et al., 2007; Supe`r et al.,
2001), tactile cortices may be mobilized into a conscious
assembly only during a later phase of top-down amplification,
synchronous to the activation of higher association cortices.
In the auditory modality, similarly, stimuli that are not
consciously detected still trigger considerable sensory process-
ing, including 40 Hz steady-state responses (Gutschalk et al.,
2008) andmismatch negativities (MMN), i.e., electrophysiological
responses that arise primarily from the temporal lobe in response
to rare, deviant, or otherwise unpredictable auditory stimuli (Allen
et al., 2000; Bekinschtein et al., 2009a; Diekhof et al., 2009; Na¨a¨-
ta¨nen, 1990). Once again, conscious and nonconscious stimuli
differ in a late (>200 ms) and global P3 wave arising from bilateral
prefronto-parietal generators, with joint enhancement of
temporal auditory cortices (Bekinschtein et al., 2009a; Diekhof
et al., 2009). These localizations are confirmed by an fMRI study
that contrasteddetectedversusundetectednear-thresholdnoise
bursts (Sadaghiani et al., 2009) (Figure 1). Similarly, an fMRI study
of speech listening at different levels of sedation showed partiallypreserved responses in temporal corticesbut the total disappear-
ance of activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus during deep
sedation (Davis et al., 2007). A study by Hasson et al. (2007)
further suggests that the content of what we consciously hear
does not dependon earlymodality-specific responses in auditory
cortex, but rather on late fronto-parietal cross-modal computa-
tions. Using the McGurk illusion (perception of a syllable ‘‘ta’’
when simultaneously hearing ‘‘pa’’ and seeing a face saying
‘‘ka’’), they dissociated the objective auditory and visual stimuli
from the subjective percept. Using fMRI repetition suppression,
they then showed that early auditory cortices coded solely for
the objective auditory stimulus, while the perceived subjective
conscious contentwas reflected in the activation of the left poste-
rior inferior frontal gyrus and anterior inferior parietal lobule. In this
instance, at least, PFC activation could not be attributed to
a generic process of attention, detection, or memory but demon-
strably encoded the specific syllable perceived.
Turning to the action domain, several studies have demon-
strated that the awareness of one’s action, surprisingly, is not
associated with primary or premotor cortices but arises from
a higher-level representation of intentions and their expected
sensory consequences; this representation involves prefrontal
and parietal cortices, notably the angular gyrus (AG) (Desmurget
et al., 2009; Farrer et al., 2008). Using direct cortical stimulation,
Desmurget et al. (2009) observed a double dissociation: premo-
tor stimulation often led to overt movements that the subject was
not aware of performing, while angular gyrus stimulation led to
a subjective perception of movement intention and performance
even in the absence of any detectable muscle activation. In
normal subjects, disrupted sensori-motor feedback has also
been used to define a minimal contrast between subliminal
versus conscious gestures. For instance, when a temporal delay
or a spatial bias was introduced in the visual feedback provided
to participants about their own hand movements, they continu-
ously adjusted their behavior, but these motor adjustments
were only perceived consciously when the disruption exceeded
a certain threshold (Farrer et al., 2008; Slachevsky et al., 2001).
fMRI revealed that this nonlinearity related to a bilateral distrib-
uted network involving AG and PFC cortices (Farrer et al., 2008).
Perhaps the clearest evidence for a two-stage process in
action awareness comes from studies of error awareness (Nieu-
wenhuis et al., 2001). In an antisaccade paradigm, participants
were instructed to move their eyes in the direction opposite to
a visual target. This instruction generated frequent errors, where
the eyes first moved toward the stimulus and then away from it.
Many of these erroneous eye movements remained undetected.
Remarkably, immediately after such undetected errors, a strong
and early (80 ms) ERP component called the error-related
negativity arose from midline frontal cortices (anterior cingulate
or pre-SMA). Only when the error was consciously detected
was this early waveform amplified and followed by a massive
P3-like waveform, which fMRI associated with the expansion
of activation into a broader network including left inferior
frontal/anterior insula activity (Klein et al., 2007).
Convergence with Studies of Inattention and Dual Tasks
The experiments reviewed so far considered primarily subliminal
paradigms where access to conscious reportability was modu-
lated by reducing the incoming sensory information. However,Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 207
Figure 5. Recruitment of Global Fronto-
Parietal Networks in Effortful Serial Tasks
(A) Simulations of the original global neuronal
workspace proposal before, during, and after
learning of an effortful Stroop-like task (adapted
from Dehaene et al., 1998a). The figure shows the
activity of various processor and workspace units
as a function of time. Workspace units show
strong activation (a) during the search for a task-
appropriate configuration of workspace units; (b)
during the effortful execution of a novel task (but
not after its routinization); and (c) after errors, or
whenever higher control is needed.
(B–D) Example of corresponding global fronto-
parietal activations as seen with fMRI. (B) Strong
activation of a distributed network involving PFC
during effortful search for the solution of
a ‘‘master-mind’’ type problem, with a sudden
collapse as soon as a routine solution is found
(adapted from Landmann et al., 2007). (C) Acti-
vation of inferior PFC during dual-task perfor-
mance which diminishes with training (adapted
from Dux et al., 2009). (D) Activation of a distribu-
tion parieto-prefrontal-cingulate network on error
and conflict trials (adapted from the meta-analysis
by Klein et al., 2007).
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drawal of attentional selection is used to modulate conscious
access (Dehaene et al., 2006), resulting in either failed (attentional
blink, AB) or delayed (psychological refractory period or PRP)
conscious access. In such states, initial visual processing, in-
dexed by P1 and N1 waves, can be largely or even entirely unaf-
fected (Sergent et al., 2005; Sigman and Dehaene, 2008; Vogel
et al., 1998). However, only perceived stimuli exhibit an amplifica-
tion of activation in task-related sensory areas (e.g., parahippo-
campal place area for pictures of places) as well as the unique
emergence of lateral and midline prefrontal and parietal areas
(see also Asplund et al., 2010; Marois et al., 2004; Slagter et al.,
2010; Williams et al., 2008). Temporally resolved fMRI studies
indicate that, during the dual-task bottleneck, PFC activity
evoked by the second task is delayed (Dux et al., 2006; Sigman
and Dehaene, 2008). With electrophysiology, the P3b waveform
again appears as a major correlate of conscious processing
that is both delayed during the PRP (Dell’acqua et al., 2005;
Sigman and Dehaene, 2008) and absent during AB (Kranczioch
et al., 2007; Sergent et al., 2005). Seen versus blinked trials are
also distinguished by another marker, the synchronization of
distant frontoparietal areas in the beta band (Gross et al., 2004).
William James (1890) noted how conscious attention and
effort are required for the controlled execution of novel nonrou-
tine sequential tasks but is no longer needed or even detrimental
once routine sets in. Thus, the comparison of effortful versus
automatic tasks provides another contrast that, although not
quite as minimal as the previous ones, should at least provide
signatures of conscious-level processing consistent with other
paradigms. Indeed, a broad network including inferior and
dorsolateral prefrontal, anterior cingulated, and lateral parietal208 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.and intraparietal components is activated
whenever human subjects perform effort-
ful single or dual tasks (Marois and Ivan-off, 2005), and its activation diminishes with training in parallel
to the reduction in behavioral cost (Dux et al., 2009). Strikingly,
it suddenly drops as soon as subjects move into a routine
mode of task execution (Landmann et al., 2007; Procyk et al.,
2000) (Figure 5). On the contrary, focal cortical regions associ-
ated with automatized processing of the relevant sensory or
motor attributes remain invariant or may even increase their acti-
vation in the course of routinization (e.g., Sigman et al., 2005).
Broad fronto-parietal networks also figure prominently among
the distributed networks of coactive areas that can be isolated
during spontaneous brain activity in the absence of an explicit
task goal (Beckmann et al., 2005; Fox et al., 2006; Greicius
et al., 2003; Mantini et al., 2007; Vincent et al., 2008). How this
activity relates to conscious processing remains debated, since
it can still be observed, to some extent, during sleep (He et al.,
2008), vegetative state (Boly et al., 2009), or sedation in both hu-
mans (Greicius et al., 2008) and monkeys (Vincent et al., 2007),
though interestingly with reduced functional connectivity
(Schrouff et al., 2011). To resolve this issue, a direct test consists
in identifying participants with a given spontaneous activity
patternandasking themwhether theywereexperiencingapartic-
ular conscious content (Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007).
Such studies reveal a tight correlation between default-mode
network activity and self-reported ‘‘mind-wandering’’ into
episodic memory and self-oriented thought. Smallwood et al.
(2008) further demonstrated that, during such mind-wandering
periods, theP3waveevokedbyexternal events is reduced.Over-
all, these findings indicate that spontaneous activity, like external
goal-driven activity, invades large-scale fronto-parietal networks
and impose a strong limitation on the processing of external
events, with the same signature as the attentional blink.
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Figure 6. Historical Steps in the Development of Models of Conscious Processing
In the Norman and Shallice (1980) model (top left), conscious processing is involved in the supervisory attentional regulation, by prefrontal cortices, of lower-level
sensori-motor chains. According to Baars (1989), conscious access occurs once information gains access to a global workspace (bottom left), which broadcasts
it to many other processors. The global neuronal workspace (GNW) hypothesis (right) proposes that associative perceptual, motor, attention, memory, and value
areas interconnect to form a higher-level unified space where information is broadly shared and broadcasted back to lower-level processors. The GNW is
characterized by its massive connectivity, made possibly by thick layers II/III with large pyramidal cells sending long-distance cortico-cortical axons, particularly
dense in prefrontal cortex (Dehaene et al., 1998a).
Neuron
ReviewIn conclusion, human neuroimaging methods and electro-
physiological recordings during conscious access, under
a broad variety of paradigms, consistently reveal a late amplifica-
tion of relevant sensory activity, long-distance cortico-cortical
synchronization at beta and gamma frequencies, and ‘‘ignition’’
of a large-scale prefronto-parietal network.
III. Theoretical Modeling of Conscious Access
The above experiments provide a convergent database of
observations. In the present section, we examine which theoret-
ical principles may account for these findings. We briefly survey
themajor theories of conscious processing, with the goal to try to
isolate a core set of principles that are common to most theories
and begin to make sense of existing observations. We then
describe in more detail a specific theory, the Global Neuronal
Workspace (GNW), whose simulations coarsely capture the con-
trasting physiological states underlying nonconscious versus
conscious processing.Convergence toward a Set of Core Concepts for
Conscious Access
Although consciousness research includes wildly speculative
proposals (Eccles, 1994; Jaynes, 1976; Penrose, 1990), research
of the past decades has led to an increasing degree of conver-
gence toward a set of concepts considered essential in most
theories (for review, see Seth, 2007). Four such concepts can
be isolated.
A supervision system. In the words of William James,
‘‘consciousness’’ appears as ‘‘an organ added for the sake of
steering a nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself’’
(James, 1890, chapter 5). Posner (Posner and Rothbart, 1998;
Posner and Snyder, 1975) and Shallice (Shallice, 1972, 1988;
Norman and Shallice, 1980) first proposed that information is
conscious when it is represented in an ‘‘executive attention’’ or
‘‘supervisory attentional’’ system that controls the activities of
lower-level sensory-motor routines and is associated with
prefrontal cortex (Figure 6). In other words, a chain of sensory,Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 209
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ness, as reviewed in the previous section, but conscious percep-
tion seems needed for the flexible control of their execution, such
as their onset, termination, inhibition, repetition, or serial chaining.
A serial processing system. Descartes (1648) first observed
that ‘‘ideas impede each other.’’ Broadbent (1958) theorized
conscious perception as involving access to a limited-capacity
channel where processing is serial, one object at a time. The
attentional blink and psychological refractory period effects
indeed confirm that conscious processing of a first stimulus
renders us temporarily unable to consciously perceive other
stimuli presently shortly thereafter. Several psychological
models now incorporate the idea that initial perceptual process-
ing is parallel and nonconscious and that conscious access is
serial and occurs at the level of a later central bottleneck (Pash-
ler, 1994) or second processing stage of working memory
consolidation (Chun and Potter, 1995).
A coherent assembly formed by re-entrant or top-down loops.
In the context of the maintenance of invariant representations of
the body/world through reafference (von Holst and Mittelstaedt,
1950), Edelman (1987) proposed re-entry as an essential compo-
nent of the creation of a unified percept: the bidirectional
exchange of signals across parallel cortical maps coding for
different aspects of the same object. More recently, the dynamic
core hypothesis (Tononi and Edelman, 1998) proposes that infor-
mation encoded by a group of neurons is conscious only if it
achieves not only differentiation (i.e., the isolation of one specific
content out of a vast repertoire of potential internal representa-
tions) but also integration (i.e., the formation of a single,
coherent, and unified representation, where the whole carries
more information than each part alone). A notable feature of
the dynamic core hypothesis is the proposal of a quantitative
mathematical measure of information integration called F, high
values of which are achieved only through a hierarchical recur-
rent connectivity and would be necessary and sufficient to
sustain conscious experience: ‘‘consciousness is integrated
information’’ (Tononi, 2008). This measure has been shown to
be operative for some conscious/nonconscious distinctions
such as anesthesia (e.g., Lee et al., 2009b; Schrouff et al.,
2011), but it is computationally complicated and, as a result,
has not yet been broadly applied tomost of theminimal empirical
contrasts reviewed above.
In related proposals, Crick and Koch (1995, 2003, 2005) sug-
gested that conscious access involves forming a stable global
neural coalition. They initially introduced reverberating gamma-
band oscillations around 40 Hz as a crucial component, then
proposed an essential role of connections to prefrontal cortex.
Lamme and colleagues (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Supe`r
et al., 2001) produced data strongly suggesting that feedforward
or bottom-up processing alone is not sufficient for conscious
access and that top-down or feedback signals forming recurrent
loops are essential to conscious visual perception. Llinas and
colleagues (Llina´s et al., 1998; Llina´s and Pare´, 1991) have also
argued that consciousness is fundamentally a thalamocortical
closed-loop property in which the ability of cells to be intrinsically
active plays a central role.
A global workspace for information sharing. The theater meta-
phor (Taine, 1870) compares consciousness to a narrow scene210 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.that allows a single actor to diffuse his message. This view has
been criticized because, at face value, it implies a conscious
homunculus watching the scene, thus leading to infinite regress
(Dennett, 1991). However, capitalizing on the earlier concept of
a blackboard system in artificial intelligence (a common data
structure shared and updated by many specialized modules),
Baars (1989) proposed a homunculus-free psychological model
where the current conscious content is represented within
a distinct mental space called global workspace, with the
capacity to broadcast this information to a set of other proces-
sors (Figure 6). Anatomically, Baars speculated that the neural
bases of his global workspace might comprise the ‘‘ascending
reticular formation of the brain stem andmidbrain, the outer shell
of the thalamus and the set of neurons projecting upward
diffusely from the thalamus to the cerebral cortex.’’
We introduced the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) model
as an alternative cortical mechanism capable of integrating the
supervision, limited-capacity, and re-entry properties (Changeux
and Dehaene, 2008; Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; Dehaene
et al., 1998a, 2003b, 2006; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
Our proposal is that a subset of cortical pyramidal cells with
long-range excitatory axons, particularly dense in prefrontal,
cingulate, and parietal regions, together with the relevant thala-
mocortical loops, form a horizontal ‘‘neuronal workspace’’ inter-
connecting the multiple specialized, automatic, and noncon-
scious processors (Figure 6). A conscious content is assumed
to be encoded by the sustained activity of a fraction of GNW
neurons, the rest being inhibited. Through their numerous recip-
rocal connections, GNWneurons amplify andmaintain a specific
neural representation. The long-distance axons of GNW neurons
then broadcast it to many other processors brain-wide. Global
broadcasting allows information to bemore efficiently processed
(because it is no longer confined to a subset of nonconscious
circuits but can be flexibly shared by many cortical processors)
and to be verbally reported (because these processors include
those involved in formulating verbal messages). Nonconscious
stimuli can be quickly and efficiently processed along automa-
tized or preinstructed processing routes before quickly decaying
within a few seconds. By contrast, conscious stimuli would be
distinguished by their lack of ‘‘encapsulation’’ in specialized
processes and their flexible circulation to various processes of
verbal report, evaluation, memory, planning, and intentional
action, many seconds after their disappearance (Baars, 1989;
Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). Dehaene and Naccache (2001)
postulate that ‘‘this global availability of information (.) is what
we subjectively experience as a conscious state.’’
Explicit Simulations of Conscious Ignition
The GNW has been implemented as explicit computer simula-
tions of neural networks (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; De-
haene et al., 1998a, 2003b; see also Zylberberg et al., 2009).
These simulations incorporate spiking neurons and synapses
with detailed membrane, ion channel, and receptor properties,
organized into distinct cortical supragranular, granular, infragra-
nular, and thalamic sectors with reasonable connectivity and
temporal delays. Although the full GNW architecture was not
simulated, four areas were selected and hierarchically intercon-
nected (Figure 7). Bottom-up feed-forward connections linked
each area to the next, while long-distance top-down
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Figure 7. Schematic Representation of the
Hypothesized Events Leading to Conscious
Access According to the GNW Model
(A) Schema illustrating the main postulated differ-
ences between subliminal and conscious pro-
cessing (adapted from Dehaene et al., 2006).
During feed-forward propagation, sensory inputs
progress through a hierarchy of sensory areas in
a feedforward manner, successively contacting
diverse and nonnecessarily compatible represen-
tations corresponding to all probabilistic interpre-
tations of the stimuli. Multiple signals converge to
support each other’s interpretation in higher-level
cortical areas. Higher areas feedback onto lower-
level sensory representations, favoring a conver-
gence toward a single coherent representation
compatible with current goals. Such a self-con-
nected system exhibits a dynamical threshold: if
the incoming activity carries sufficient weight, it
leads to the ignition of a self-supporting, rever-
berating, temporary, metastable, and distributed
cell assembly that represents the current
conscious contents and broadcasts it to virtually
all distant sites.
(B) Architecture of an explicit neuronal simulation
model of a small part of the GNW architecture
(adapted from Dehaene and Changeux, 2005;
Dehaene et al., 2003b). The model contains
thalamic and cortical excitatory and inhibitory
neurons, organized in layers with realistic inter-
connections (inset). Stimuli T1 and T2 can be
presented at the lower level of a hierarchy of four
successive areas, linked by feedforward (AMPA)
nearest-neighbor connections and by global
feedback (NMDA connections).
(C) Simulation of two single trials in which a iden-
tical pulse of brief stimulation was applied to
sensory inputs for T1 (Dehaene and Changeux,
2005). Fluctuations in ongoing activity prevented
ignition in the left diagram, resulting in a purely
feedforward propagation dying out in higher-level
areas. In the right diagram, the same stimulus
crossed the threshold for ignition, resulting in self-
amplification, a global state of activation, oscilla-
tion and synchrony, and a late long-lasting wave of
late activation reaching back to early sensory
areas.
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a simplifying assumption, bottom-up connections impinged on
glutamate AMPA receptors while the top-down ones, which
are slower, more numerous, and more diffuse, primarily involved
glutamate NMDA receptors (the plausibility of this hypothesis is
discussed further below). In higher areas, inputs competed with
each other through GABAergic inhibitory interneurons, and it
was assumed (though not explicitly simulated) that the winning
representation would be broadcasted by additional long-
distance connections to yet other cortical regions.
Initial simulations explored the sequence of activity leading to
conscious access. When sensory stimulation was simulated asNeurona brief depolarizing current at the lowest
thalamic level, activation propagated ac-
cording to two successive phases (see
Figure 7): (1) initially, a brief wave of exci-
tation progressed into the simulated
hierarchy through fast AMPA-mediatedfeedforward connections, with an amplitude and duration
directly related to the initial input; (2) in a second stage, mediated
by the slower NMDA-mediated feedback connections, the
advancing feed-forward wave amplified its own inputs in
a cascadingmanner, quickly leading the whole stimulus-relevant
network into a global self-sustained reverberating or ‘‘ignited’’
state. This ignition was characterized by an increased power of
local cortico-thalamic oscillations in the gamma band and their
synchrony across areas (Dehaene et al., 2003b). This second
phase of the simulation reproduces most of the empirical signa-
tures of conscious access: late, all-or-none, cortically distributed
potentials involving prefrontal cortex and other high-level70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 211
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frequency power and synchrony (e.g., de Lafuente and Romo,
2006; Del Cul et al., 2007; Gaillard et al., 2009).
In GNW simulations, ignition manifests itself, at the cortical
level, as a depolarization of layer II/III apical dendrites of pyra-
midal dendrites in a subset of activated GNW neurons defining
the conscious contents, the rest being inhibited. In a geometri-
cally accurate model of the pyramidal cell, the summed postsyn-
aptic potentials evoked by long-distance signaling among these
distributed sets of active cells would create slow intracellular
currents traveling from the apical dendrites toward the cell’s
soma, summing up on the cortical surface as negative slow
cortical potentials (SCPs) over regions coding for the conscious
stimulus (see He and Raichle, 2009). Simultaneously, many other
GNW neurons are strongly suppressed by lateral inhibition via
GABAergic interneurons and define what the current conscious
content is not. As already noted by Rockstroh et al. (1992, p.
175), assuming that many more neurons are inhibited than acti-
vated, ‘‘The surface positivity corresponding to these inhibited
networks would then dominate over the relatively smaller spots
of negativity caused by the reverberating excitation.’’ Thus, the
model can explain why, during conscious access, the resulting
event-related potential is dominated by a positive waveform,
the P3b. This view also predicts that scalp negativities should
appear specifically over areas dense in neurons coding for the
current conscious content. Indeed, in a spatial working memory
task, all stimuli evoke a broad P3b, but when subtracting ERPs
ipsilateral and controlateral to the side of the memorized items,
negative potentials appeared over parietal cortex contralateral
to the memorized locations (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004).
Further GNW simulations showed that ignition could fail to be
triggered under specific conditions, thus leading to simulated
nonconscious states. For very brief or low-amplitude stimuli,
a feedforward wave was seen in the initial thalamic and cortical
stages of the simulation, but it died out without triggering the
late global activation, because it was not able to gather sufficient
self-sustaining reverberant activation (Dehaene and Changeux,
2005). Even at higher stimulus amplitudes, the second global
phase could also be disrupted if another incoming stimulus
had been simultaneously accessed (Dehaene et al., 2003b).
Such a disruption occurs because during ignition, the GNW is
mobilized as a whole, some GNW neurons being active while
the rest is actively inhibited, thus preventing multiple simulta-
neous ignitions. A strict seriality of conscious access and pro-
cessing is therefore predicted and has been simulated (Dehaene
and Changeux, 2005; Dehaene et al., 2003b; Zylberberg et al.,
2010). Overall, these simulations capture the two main types of
experimental conditions known to lead to nonconscious pro-
cessing: subliminal states due to stimulus degradation (e.g.,
masking), and preconscious states due to distraction by a simul-
taneous task (e.g., attentional blink).
The transition to the ignited state can be described, in theoret-
ical physics terms, as a stochastic phase transition—a sudden
change in neuronal dynamics whose occurrence depends in
part on stimulus characteristics and in part on spontaneous fluc-
tuations in activity (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; Dehaene
et al., 2003b). In GNW simulations, prestimulus fluctuations in
neural discharges only have a small effect on the early sensory212 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.stage, which largely reflects objective stimulus amplitude and
duration, but they have a large influence on the second slower
stage, which is characterized by NMDA-based reverberating
integration and ultimately leads to a bimodal ‘‘all-or-none’’ distri-
bution of activity, similar to empirical observations (Quiroga et al.,
2008; Sergent et al., 2005; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004). Due to
these fluctuations, across trials, the very same stimulus does or
does not lead to global ignition, depending in part on the precise
phase of the stimulus relative to ongoing spontaneous activity.
This notion that prestimulus baseline fluctuations partially predict
conscious perception is now backed up by considerable empir-
ical data (e.g., Boly et al., 2007; Palva et al., 2005; Sadaghiani
et al., 2009; Supe`r et al., 2003; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009).
More generally, these simulations provide a partial neural imple-
mentation of the psychophysical framework according to which
conscious access corresponds to a ‘‘decision’’ based on the
accumulation of stimulus-based evidence, prior knowledge,
and biases (Dehaene, 2008; for specific implementations, see
Lau, 2008, and themathematical appendix inDel Cul et al., 2009).
Modeling Spontaneous Activity and Serial Goal-Driven
Processing
An original feature of the GNW model, absent from many other
formal neural network models, is the occurence of highly struc-
tured spontaneous activity (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005).
Even in the absence of external inputs, the simulated GNW
neurons are assumed to fire spontaneously, in a top-down
manner, starting from the highest hierarchical levels of the simu-
lation and propagating downward to form globally synchronized
ignited states. When the ascending vigilance signal is large,
several such spontaneous ignitions follow each other in a never-
ending ‘‘stream’’ and can block ignition by incoming external
stimuli (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005). These simulations
capture some of the empirical observations on inattentional
blindness (Mack and Rock, 1998) and mind wandering (Christoff
et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood et al., 2008). More
complex network architectures have also been simulated in
which a goal state is set and continuously shapes the structured
patterns of activity that are spontaneously generated, until the
goal is ultimately attained (Dehaene and Changeux, 1997; Zyl-
berberg et al., 2010). In these simulations, ignited states are
stable only for a transient time period and can be quickly desta-
bilized by a negative reward signal that indicates deviation from
the current goal, in which case they are spontaneously and
randomly replaced by another discrete combination of work-
space neurons. The dynamics of such networks is thus charac-
terized by a constant flow of individual coherent episodes of vari-
able duration, selected by reward signals in order to achieve
a defined goal state. Architectures based on these notions
have been applied to a variety of tasks (delayed response: De-
haene and Changeux, 1989; Wisconsin card sorting: Dehaene
and Changeux, 1991; Tower of London: Dehaene and
Changeux, 1997; Stroop: Dehaene et al., 1998a), although
a single architecture common to all tasks is not yet in sight (but
see Rougier et al., 2005). As illustrated in Figure 5, they provide
a preliminary account of why GNW networks are spontaneously
active, in a sustained manner, during effortful tasks that require
series of conscious operations, including search, dual-task,
and error processing.
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lie at the confluence of the diverse theories that have been
proposed to account for conscious access: high-level supervi-
sion; serial processing; coherent stability through re-entrant
loops; and global information availability. Furthermore, once im-
plemented in the specific neuronal architecture of the GNW
model, these concepts begin to provide a schematic account of
the neurophysiological signatures that, empirically, distinguish
conscious access from nonconscious processing. In particular,
simulations of the GNW architecture can explain the close simi-
larity of the brain activations seen during (1) conscious access to
a single external stimulus; (2) effortful serial processing; and (3)
spontaneous fluctuations in the absence of any stimulus or task.
IV. Present Experimental and Theoretical Challenges
The existing empirical data on conscious access still present
many challenges for theorizing. Indeed, the above theoretical
synthesis may still be refuted if some of its key neural compo-
nents were found to be implausible or altogether absent in
primate cerebral architecture, or if its predicted patterns of
activity (the late ‘‘ignition’’) were found to be unnecessary, arti-
factual, noncoding, or noncausally related to conscious states.
We consider each of these potential challenges in turn.
Connectivity and Architecture of Long-Distance Cortical
Networks
Pyramidal neurons with long-distance axons. The main anatom-
ical premise of the GNWmodel is that it consists of ‘‘a distributed
set of cortical neurons characterized by their ability to receive
from and send back to homologous neurons in other cortical
areas horizontal projections through long-range excitatory axons
mostly originating from the pyramidal cells of layers II and III’’
(Dehaene et al., 1998a) and more densely distributed in
prefrontal and inferior parietal cortices. Do these units actually
exist? The ‘‘special morphology’’ of the pyramidal cells from
the cerebral cortex was already noted by Cajal (1899–1904),
who mentioned their ‘‘long axons with multiple collaterals’’ and
their ‘‘very numerous and complex dendrites.’’ Von Economo
(1929) further noted that these large pyramidal cells in layers III
and V are especially abundant in areas ‘‘spread over the anterior
two-thirds of the frontal lobe, (.) the superior parietal lobule’’
and ‘‘the cingulate cortex,’’ among other cortical areas. Recent
investigations have confirmed that long-distance cortico-
cortical and callosal fibers primarily (though not exclusively) arise
from layer II-III pyramids. Furthermore, quantitative analyses of
the dendritic field morphology of layer III pyramidal neurons re-
vealed a continuous increase of complexity of the basal
dendrites from the occipital up to the prefrontal cortex within
a given species (DeFelipe and Farin˜as, 1992; Elston and Rosa,
1997, 1998) and from lower species (owl monkey, marmoset)
up to humans (Elston, 2003). Layer IV PFC pyramidal neurons
have as many as 16 times more spines in PFC than in V1 and,
as a result, ‘‘the highly spinous cells in prefrontal areas may inte-
grate many more inputs than cells in areas such as V1, TE, and
7a’’ (Elston, 2000). These observations confirm that PFC cells
exhibit the morphological adaptations needed for massive
long-distance communication, information integration, and
broadcasting postulated in the GNW model and suggest that
this architecture is particularly developed in the human species.Global brain-scale white matter networks involving PFC. The
GNW model further assumes that long-distance neurons form
brain-scale networks involving prefrontal cortex as a key node.
PFC indeed receives the most diverse set of corticocortical
inputs from areas involved in processing all sensory modalities
(Cavada et al., 2000; Fuster, 2008; Kringelbach and Rolls,
2004; Pandya and Yeterian, 1990; Petrides and Pandya, 2009).
In the monkey cerebral cortex, long-range connections link,
among others, the prefrontal cortex (area 46), the superior
temporal sulcus, parietal area 7a, and the hippocampus together
with the contralateral anterior and posterior cingulum, area 19,
and the parahippocampal gyrus (Goldman-Rakic, 1988). In addi-
tion, areas within PFC are multiply interconnected (Barbas and
Pandya, 1989; Preuss and Goldman-Rakic, 1991), and the
superficial layers in PFC are characterized by an abundance of
horizontal intrinsic axon projections that arise from supragranu-
lar pyramidal cells (Kritzer andGoldman-Rakic, 1995; Melchitzky
et al., 1998, 2001; Pucak et al., 1996), thus exhibiting themassive
and recurrent interconnectivity needed to sustain GNW ignition.
In humans, the course of cortical tracts can now be confirmed
by diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) and tractography algorithms
(Figure 8), yet with important limitations. Measurements typically
average over relatively large voxels (a few millimeters aside) that
contain a diversity of criss-crossing fibers. Even recent articles
claiming to study the entire connectome (e.g., Hagmann et al.,
2008) suffer for underestimation of the true long-distance
connectivity of areas 46, 6, FEF, and LIP, critical to GNW theory
and known from macaque invasive tracer studies and careful
human anatomical dissections dating from the end of the 19th
century (Dejerine, Meynert, Fleschig). In a still up-to-date
volume, Dejerine (1895) distinguished five main tracts of long
association fibers running deeply in the human white matter.
Consistent with the GNW hypothesis, four of them connect
prefrontal cortex with other cortical areas and are confirmed
by diffusion tensor tractography (Catani and Thiebaut de Schot-
ten, 2008) and by correlation of cortical thickness measures
(Bassett et al., 2008; He et al., 2009). The networks thus identi-
fied converge well with those extracted by fMRI intercorrelation
patterns during the resting state or by phase synchrony in the
beta band during either working memory (Bassett et al., 2009)
or attentional blink (Gross et al., 2004).
The importance of long-distance cortical projection pathways
in conscious perception was recently tested in patients at the
very first clinical stage of multiple sclerosis (MS), a neurological
disease characterized by extensive white matter damage
leading to perturbed long-distance connectivity (He et al.,
2009; Reuter et al., 2007; Reuter et al., 2009). As predicted,
MS patients showed abnormal conscious perception of masked
stimuli: they needed a longer target-mask delay before
conscious access occurred. Furthermore, this behavioral
anomaly correlated with structural damage in the dorsolateral
prefrontal white matter and the right occipito-frontal fasciculus
(Figure 8). Importantly, subliminal priming was preserved.
While recent results thus support the existence of massive
long-distance cortical networks involving PFC and their role in
conscious perception, two points should be stressed. First, the
PFC is increasingly being decomposed into multiple specialized
and lateralized subnetworks (e.g., Koechlin et al., 2003; VoytekNeuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 213
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Figure 8. Role of Long-Distance Connections in Conscious Access
(A) Diffusion-based tracking of human brain connectivity reveals long-distance fiber tracts, both callosal (left) and intrahemispheric (right), forming an anatomical
substrate for the proposed GNW (images courtesy of Michel Thiebaut de Schotten and Flavio Dell’Acqua).
(B and C) Pathologies of long-distance fiber tracts can be associated with deficits in conscious access. Spatial neglect patients (B) showing perturbed conscious
processing of left-sided stimuli exhibit impaired right-hemispheric communication between occipital and parietal regions and frontal cortex along the inferior
fronto-occipito fasciculus (IFOF), shown in yellow (image courtesy of Michel Thiebaut de Schotten; see Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2005; Urbanski et al., 2008).
Multiple sclerosis patients (C) in the very first stages of the disease exhibit impairments in the threshold for conscious detection of a masked visual target,
correlating with impaired magnetization transfer, a measure of white matter integrity, in several long-distance fiber tracts (adapted from Reuter et al., 2009).
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contradicting the GNW hypothesis that these subnetworks,
through their tight interconnections, interact so strongly as to
make any information coded in one area quickly available to all
others. Second, in addition to PFC, the nonspecific thalamic
nuclei, the basal ganglia, and some cortical nodes are likely to
contribute to global information broadcasting (Voytek and
Knight, 2010). The precuneus, in particular, may also operate
as a cortical ‘‘hub’’ with a massive degree of interconnectivity
(Hagmann et al., 2008; Iturria-Medina et al., 2008). This region,
plausibly homologous to the highly connected macaque poster-
omedial cortex (PMC) (Parvizi et al., 2006), is an aggregate of
convergence-divergence zones (Meyer and Damasio, 2009)214 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.and is tightly connected to PFC area 46 and other workspace
regions (Goldman-Rakic, 1999). In humans, the PMC may play
a critical role in humans in self-referential processing (Cavanna
and Trimble, 2006; Damasio, 1999; Vogt and Laureys, 2005),
thus allowing any conscious content to be integrated into
a subjective first-person perspective.
NMDA receptors and GNW simulations. GNW simulations
assume that long-distance bottom-up connections primarily
impinge on fast glutamate AMPA receptors while top-down
ones primarily concern the slower glutamate NMDA receptor.
This assumption contributes importantly to the temporal
dynamics of the model, particularly the separation between
a fast phasic bottom-up phase and a late sustained integration
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as both receptor types are known to be present in variable
proportions at glutamatergic synapses (for pioneering data on
human receptor distribution, see Amunts et al., 2010). However,
in agreement with the model, physiological recordings suggest
that NMDA antagonists do not interfere with early bottom-up
sensory activity, but only affect later integrative events such as
the mismatch negativity in auditory cortex (Javitt et al., 1996).
Thus, although GNW simulations adopted a highly simplified
anatomical assumption of radically distinct distributions of
NMDA and AMPA, which may have to be qualified in more real-
istic models, the notion that NMDA receptors contribute
primarily to late, slow, and top-down integrative processes is
plausible (for a related argument, see Wong and Wang, 2006).
Is Conscious Perception Slow and Late?
A strong statement of the proposed theoretical synthesis is that
early bottom-up sensory events, prior to global ignition (<200–
300ms), contribute solely to nonconscious percept construction
and do not systematically distinguish consciously seen from
unseen stimuli. In apparent contradiction with this view, certain
experiments, using both visual (Pins and Ffytche, 2003) or tactile
stimuli (Palva et al., 2005), have observed that the early incoming
wave of sensory-evoked activity (e.g., P1 component) is already
enhanced on conscious compared to nonconscious trials.
Lamme and collaborators (Fahrenfort et al., 2007) found amplifi-
cation in visual cortex, just posterior to the P1 wave (110–
140 ms). More frequently, at around 200–300 ms, surrounding
the P2 ERP component, more negative voltages are reported
over posterior cortices on visible compared to invisible trials
(Del Cul et al., 2007; Fahrenfort et al., 2007; Koivisto et al.,
2008, 2009; Railo and Koivisto, 2009; Sergent et al., 2005). Koi-
visto and collaborators have called this event the visual aware-
ness negativity (VAN).
Several arguments, however, mitigate the possibility that
these early or midlatency differences already reflect conscious
perception. First, they may not be necessary and sufficient, as
they are absent from several experiments (e.g., Lamy et al.,
2009; van Aalderen-Smeets et al., 2006) (although one cannot
exclude that they failed to be detected). Second, and most
crucially, their profile of variation with stimulus variables such
as target-mask delay does not always track the variations in
subject’s conscious reports (Del Cul et al., 2007; van Aalderen-
Smeets et al., 2006). Third, they typically consist only in small
modulations that ride on top of early sensory activations that
are still strongly present on nonconscious trials (Del Cul et al.,
2007; Fahrenfort et al., 2007; Sergent et al., 2005). Fourth, in
this respect they resemble the small electrophysiological modu-
lations that have been found to partially predict later perception
even prior to the stimulus (e.g., Boly et al., 2007; Palva et al.,
2005; Sadaghiani et al., 2009; Supe`r et al., 2003; Wyart and Tal-
lon-Baudry, 2009). The timing of these events makes it logically
impossible that they already participate in the neural mechanism
of conscious access. Similar, early differences in sensory activa-
tion between conscious and nonconscious trialsmay reflect fluc-
tuations in prestimulus priors and in sensory evidence that
contribute to subsequent conscious access, rather than be
constitutive of a conscious state per se (Dehaene andChangeux,
2005; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009).The evidence on this topic is still evolving, however, as a recent
study found strong correlation of visibility with the P3b compo-
nent when participants had no expectation of the stimuli, but
a shift to the earlier P2 component when they already had
a working memory representation of the target (Melloni et al.,
2011). This study suggests that the timing of conscious access
may vary with the experimental paradigm and that a Bayesian
perspective, taking into account the subject’s prior knowledge
at multiple hierarchical cortical levels (Del Cul et al., 2009; Kiebel
et al., 2008), may be an essential conceptual ingredient that still
needs to be integrated to the above synthesis.
Whether it takes 200 ms, 300 ms, or even more, the slow and
integrative nature of conscious perception is confirmed behav-
iorally by observations such as the ‘‘rabbit illusion’’ and its vari-
ants (Dennett, 1991; Geldard and Sherrick, 1972; Libet et al.,
1983), where the way in which a stimulus is ultimately perceived
is influenced by poststimulus events arising several hundreds of
milliseconds after the original stimulus. Psychophysical para-
digms that rely on quickly alternating stimuli confirm that
conscious perception integrates over 100 ms or more, while
nonconscious perception is comparatively much faster (e.g.,
Forget et al., 2010; Vul and MacLeod, 2006).
Interestingly, recent research also suggests that spontaneous
brain activity, as assessed by resting-state EEG recordings, may
be similarly parsed into a stochastic series of slow ‘‘micro-
states,’’ stable for at least 100 ms, each exclusive of the other,
and separated by sharp transitions (Lehmann and Koenig,
1997; Van de Ville et al., 2010). These microstates have recently
been related to some of the fMRI resting-state networks (Britz
et al., 2010). Crucially, they are predictive of the thought contents
reported by participants when they are suddenly interrupted
(Lehmann et al., 1998, 2010). Thus, whether externally induced
or internally generated, the ‘‘stream of consciousness’’ may
consist in a series of slow, global, and transiently stable cortical
states (Changeux and Michel, 2004).
Can Nonconscious Stimuli Produce a Global Ignition?
Another pillar of the proposed theoretical synthesis is that global
ignition is unique to conscious states. This view would be chal-
lenged if some nonconscious stimuli were found to reproducibly
evoke intense PFC activations, P3b waves, or late and distrib-
uted patterns of brain-scale synchronization. Taking up this chal-
lenge, some studies have indeed reported small but significant
activations of prefrontal regions and a P3-like wave evoked by
infrequent nonconscious stimuli (Bra´zdil et al., 1998, 2001;
Muller-Gass et al., 2007; Salisbury et al., 1992). However, this
wave is usually a novelty P3a response, with a sharp midline
anterior positivity suggesting focal anterior midline generators,
rather than the global P3 or ‘‘late positive complex’’ response
evoked by novel stimuli. Similarly, van Gaal et al. (2011) used
fMRI to examine which areas contributed to subliminal versus
conscious processing of ‘‘no-go’’ signals—rare visual cues that
instructed subjects to refrain from responding on this particular
trial. Their initial observations suggested, provocatively, that
subliminal no-go signals evoked prefrontal potentials corre-
sponding to nonconscious executive processing (van Gaal
et al., 2008). Subsequent fMRI, however, indicated that the
generators of the subliminal response inhibition effect were
restricted to a small set of specialized processors in midlineNeuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 215
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inferior frontal gyrus. Only conscious no-go signals triggered
a broad and more anterior activation expanding into anterior
cingulate, inferior, and middle frontal gyrus, dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, and inferior parietal cortex—a network fully
compatible with the GNW model (see Figure 1).
Identifying the limits of nonconscious processing remains an
active area of research, as new techniques for presentation of
nonconscious stimuli are constantly appearing (e.g., Arnold
et al., 2008; Wilke et al., 2003). A recent masking study observed
that subliminal task-switching cues evoked detectable activa-
tions in premotor, prefrontal, and temporal cortices (Lau and
Passingham, 2007), but with a much reduced amplitude
compared to conscious cues. Another more challenging study
(Diaz and McCarthy, 2007) reported a large network of cortical
perisylvian regions (inferior frontal, inferior temporal, and angular
gyrus) activated by subliminal words relative to subliminal pseu-
dowords, and surprisingly more extended than in previous
reports (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2001). Attentional blink studies
also suggest that unseen words may cause surprisingly long-
lasting ERP components (N400) (see also Gaillard et al., 2007;
Vogel et al., 1998). A crucial question for future research is
whether these activations remain confined to specialized subcir-
cuits, for instance in the left temporal lobe (Sergent et al., 2005),
or whether they constitute true instances of global cortical pro-
cessing without consciousness.
Do Prefrontal and Parietal Networks Play a Causal Role
in Conscious Access?
Brain imaging is only correlational in nature, and leaves open the
possibility that distributed ignition involving PFC is a mere
epiphenomenon or a consequence of conscious access, rather
than being one of its necessary causes. Causality is a demanding
concept that can only be assessed by systematic lesion or inter-
ferencemethods, which are of very limited applicability in human
subjects. Nevertheless, one prediction of the GNWmodel is test-
able: lesioning or interfering with prefrontal or parietal cortex
activity, at sites quite distant from visual areas, should disrupt
conscious vision. This prediction was initially judged as so coun-
terintuitive as to be immediately refuted by clinical observations,
because frontal lobe patients do not appear to be unconscious
(Pollen, 1999). However, recent evidence actually supports the
GNW account. In normal subjects, transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS) over either parietal or prefrontal cortex can prevent
conscious perception and even trigger a sudden subjective
disappearance of visual stimulis during prolonged fixation (Kanai
et al., 2008), change blindness (Beck et al., 2006), binocularly
rivalry (Carmel et al., 2010), inattentional blindness (Babiloni
et al., 2007), and attentional blink paradigms (Kihara et al.,
2011). Over prefrontal cortex, bilateral theta-burst TMS leads
to a reduction of subjective visibility with preserved objective
sensori-motor performance (Rounis et al., 2010). We recently
made similar observations in patients with focal prefrontal
lesions (Del Cul et al., 2009): their masking threshold was signif-
icantly elevated, in tight correlation with the degree of expansion
of the lesions into left anterior prefrontal cortex, while subliminal
performance on ‘‘not-seen’’ trials did not differ from normal. In
more severe and diffuse cases, following traumatic brain injury,
bilateral lesions of fronto-parietal cortices or, characteristically,216 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.of the underlying white matter, can cause coma or vegetative
state (Tshibanda et al., 2009). Frontal-lobe patients also suffer
from impaired conscious processing, in such syndromes as
hemineglect, abulia, akinetic mutism, anosognosia, or impaired
autonoetic memory, while they frequently exhibit preserved or
even heightened capacity for automatic action as indexed by
utilization and imitation behaviors (Husain and Kennard, 1996;
Lhermitte, 1983; Passingham, 1993). Indeed, spatial hemine-
glect, in which conscious access fails for stimuli contralateral
to the lesion, can arise from focal frontal lesions as well as
from impairments of the long-distance fiber tracts linking poste-
rior visual areas with the frontal lobe (Bartolomeo et al., 2007; He
et al., 2007; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2005; Urbanski et al.,
2008) (Figure 8).
While suggestive, these observations do not quite suffice to
establish that a frontal contribution is causally necessary for
conscious perception. Arguably, the above effects may not
necessarily indicate a direct or central contribution of PFC to
conscious access, but rather could be mediated by another
brain structure under the influence of PFC or parietal networks,
such as the thalamic nuclei. Also, it is difficult to exclude a contri-
bution of reduced top-down attention or enhanced distractibility
in frontal patients or TMS subjects—although some studies have
attempted to control for these factors by equalizing primary
task performance (Rounis et al., 2010) or by demonstrating
a preserved capacity for attentional modulation (Del Cul et al.,
2009). Ultimately, the crucial experiment would involve inducing
a change in the actual conscious content, rather than a mere
elevation of the reportability threshold, by stimulating PFC or
other components of the GNW networks. While we know of no
such experiment yet, microstimulation and optogenetic methods
now make it feasible, at least in nonhuman animals.
Does the Theory Lead to Clinical Applications?
A strong test for any theory of consciousness is whether it can be
clinically used. Conscious access is altered or reduced in three
clinicial situations: schizophrenia, anesthesia, and loss of
consciousness due to coma or vegetative state. Can the
proposed theoretical synthesis shed some light on these issues?
Schizophrenia. Friston and Frith (1995) first hypothesized that
schizophrenia results from a functional disconnection of long-
distance prefrontal cortex projection affecting primarily the
strength of N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor (NMDAR)-mediated
synaptic transmission (Niswender and Conn, 2010; see also
Roopun et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2009). Bullmore et al.
(1997) further suggested a disruption of anatomical connectivity
possibly associated with an aberrant synaptic elimination during
late adolescence and early adulthood (Changeux and Danchin,
1976; McGlashan and Hoffman, 2000), a possibility consistent
with the fact that many potential risk genes are involved in
neuronal and connectivity development (Karlsgodt et al., 2008).
The volume or density of white matter tracks is, indeed, reduced
in a number of regions, including the temporal and prefrontal
lobes, the anterior limb of the internal capsule, and the cingulum
bundle (Lynall et al., 2010; Oh et al., 2009). The cingulate fascic-
ulus disconnection would, secondarily, impair the link to reward
and emotional systems (Holland and Gallagher, 2004), thus
possibly accounting for the known effect of dopaminergic neuro-
leptics.
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Figure 9. Cortical Measures of Loss of Consciousness in Sleep, Anesthesia, and Vegetative State
(A) Massive drops in cortical metabolism observed with PET rCBF measurements in slow-wave sleep (Maquet et al., 1997), anesthesia (Kaisti et al., 2002), and
vegetative state (Laureys et al., 2004).
(B) Reduced activity in a ‘‘resting-state’’ distributed cortical network in three vegetative state patients, as measured by independent component analysis of fMRI
data (adapted from Cauda et al., 2009).
(C) Sudden change in dimensional activation, a nonlinear dynamics measure of EEG complexity, at the precise point of loss of consciousness during anesthesia
(adapted from Velly et al., 2007). Signals were measured from the scalp as well as from the thalamus using depth electrodes (left). Only the scalp (cortical) EEG
showed a dramatic and discontinuous change accompanying loss of consciousness (right).
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hypothesis that disruption of PFC long-distance connections
impairs conscious access. Indeed, there is direct evidence for
impaired neural signatures of conscious access, together with
normal subliminal processing, in schizophrenic patients (De-
haene et al., 2003a; Del Cul et al., 2006; Luck et al., 2006). As
in frontal patients, the threshold for conscious access tomasked
visual stimuli is elevated in schizophrenia (Del Cul et al., 2006).
The P3b wave is typically delayed and reduced in amplitude, in
both chronic and first-episode schizophrenics (Demiralp et al.,
2002; van der Stelt et al., 2004) and their siblings (Groom et al.,
2008). Frontal slow waves associated with working memory
are similarly impaired (Kayser et al., 2006). Gamma- and beta-
band power and long-distance phase synchrony are drastically
reduced, even during simple perceptual tasks (Uhlhaas et al.,
2006; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2006). By applying graph-theoretical
tools toMEG recordings, Bassett et al. (2009) observed that acti-
vation in the beta and gamma bands failed to organize into long-
distance parieto-frontal networks that were ‘‘cost-efficient,’’ i.e.,had close to the minimal number of connections needed to
confer a high efficiency of information transmission. In summary,
the neuronal processes of conscious access appear systemati-
cally deteriorated in schizophrenia.
Anesthesia. A classical question concerns whether general
anesthetics alter consciousness by binding to molecular target
sites, principally ion channels and ligand-gated ion channels (For-
man and Miller, 2011; Li et al., 2010; Nury et al., 2011) present all
over the cortex, in specific and nonspecific thalamic nuclei, or, as
suggested by intracerebral microinjections (Sukhotinsky et al.,
2007), localized to specific sets of brain stem neurons (for review,
see Alkire et al., 2008; Franks, 2008). Anesthetic-induced loss of
consciousness usually coincides with the disruption of activity in
extensive regions of cerebral cortex, particularly the precuneus,
posterior cingulate cortex, cuneus, localized regions of the lateral
frontal and parietal cortices, and occasionally the cerebellum
(Franks, 2008; Kaisti et al., 2002; Schrouff et al., 2011; Veselis
et al., 2004) (Figure 9). Consistent with these views, Velly et al.
(2007) found that during induction of anesthesia by sevofuraneNeuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 217
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EEGcomplexity decreaseddramatically at theprecise timewhere
consciousness was lost, while for several minutes there was little
change in subcortical signals, and eventually a slow decline
(Figure 9). These data suggest that in humans, the early stage of
anesthesia correlates with cortical disruption, and that the effects
on the thalamus are indirectly driven by cortical feedback (Alkire
et al., 2008). Indeed, in the course of anesthesia induction, there
is a decrease inEEGcoherence in the 20 to 80Hz frequency range
between right and left frontal cortices and between frontal and
occipital territories (JohnandPrichep,2005).Quantitativeanalysis
of EEG under propofol induction further indicates a reduction of
mean information integration, as measured by Tononi’s Phi
measure, around the g-band (40 Hz) and a breakdown of the
spatiotemporal organization of this particular band (Lee et al.,
2009b). In agreement with experiments carried out with rats
(Imas et al., 2005; Imas et al., 2006), quantitative EEG analysis in
humans under propofol anesthesia induction noted a decrease
of directed feedback connectivity with loss of consciousness
and a return with responsiveness to verbal command (Lee et al.,
2009a). Also, during anesthesia induced by the benzodiazepine
midazolam, an externally induced transcranial pulse evoked reli-
able initial activity monitored by ERPs in humans, but the subse-
quent late phase of propagation to distributed areas was abol-
ished (Ferrarelli et al., 2010). These observations are consistent
with the postulated role of top-down frontal-posterior amplifica-
tion in conscious access (see also Supe`r et al., 2001).
Coma and vegetative state. The clinical distinctions between
coma, vegetative state (Laureys, 2005), and minimal conscious-
ness (Giacino, 2005) remain poorly defined, and even fully
conscious but paralyzed patients with locked-in syndrome can
remain undetected. It is therefore of interest to see whether
objective neuralmeasuresandGNWtheory canhelpdiscriminate
them. In coma and vegetative state, as with general anesthesia,
global metabolic activity typically decreases to 50% of normal
levels (Laureys, 2005). This decrease is not homogeneous,
however, but particularly pronounced in GNW areas including
lateral and mesial prefrontal and inferior parietal cortices
(Figure 9). Spontaneous recovery from VS is accompanied by
a functional restoration of this broad frontoparietal network (Lau-
reys et al., 1999) and some of its cortico-thalamo-cortical
connections (Laureys et al., 2000; see also Voss et al., 2006).
Anatomically, prediction of recovery from coma relies on the
comprehensive assessment of all structures involved in arousal
and awareness functions, namely, the ascending reticular acti-
vating system located in the postero-superior part of the brain-
stem and structures encompassing thalamus, basal forebrain,
and fronto-parietal association cortices (Tshibanda et al.,
2009). Lesion or inhibition of part of this system suffices to cause
immediate coma (e.g., Parvizi and Damasio, 2003). Studies on
traumatic coma patients with conventional MRI showed that
lesions of the pons, midbrain, and basal ganglia were predictive
of poor outcome especially when they were bilateral (Tshibanda
et al., 2009). In relation with the GNWmodel, it is noteworthy that
prediction of nonrecovery after 1 year could be calculated with
up to 86% sensitivity and 97% specificity when taking into
account both diffusion tensor and spectroscopic measures of
cortical white matter integrity (Tshibanda et al., 2009).218 Neuron 70, April 28, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.The objective neural measures of conscious processing
demonstrated earlier in this review should be applicable to the
difficult clinical problem of detecting consciousness in noncom-
municating patients. Using fMRI, a few patients initially classified
as vegetative by clinical signs showed essentially normal activa-
tions of distributed long-distance cortical networks during
speech processing and mental imagery tasks (Owen et al.,
2006; Monti et al., 2010), and one patient proved able to volun-
tarily control them to provide yes/no answers to simple personal
questions, clearly indicating some degree of preserved
conscious processing (Monti et al., 2010). In an effort to isolate
a more theoretically validated scalp signature of conscious
sensory processing, Bekinschtein et al. (2009a) recorded ERPs
to local versus global violations of an auditory regularity. When
hearing a deviant tone after a sequence of repeated standard
tones (sequenceXXXXY), a localmismatch responsewas elicited
nonconsciously even in coma and vegetative-state patients, as
previously demonstrated (e.g., Fischer et al., 2004). However,
when this sequence XXXXY was repeatedly presented, such
that the final tone change could be expected, the presentation
of a deviant monotonic sequence (XXXXX) engendered a P3b
wave in normal subjects that was absent in coma patients and
in most vegetative-state patients but could still be observed in
minimally conscious and locked-in patients. This paradigm,
founded upon previous identification of the P3b component as
a signature of conscious processing, is now undergoing valida-
tion as a means of identifying residual conscious processing in
patients (Faugeras et al., 2011).
V. Conclusion and Future Research Directions
The present review was deliberately limited to conscious access.
Several authors argue, however, for additional, higher-order
concepts of consciousness. For Damasio and Meyer (2009),
core consciousness of incoming sensory information requires
integrating it with a sense of self (the specific subjective point of
view of the perceiving organism) to form a representation of how
the organism ismodified by the information; extended conscious-
ness occurs when this representation is additionally related to the
memorized past and anticipated future (see also Edelman, 1989).
For Rosenthal (2004), a higher-order thought, coding for the very
fact that the organism is currently representing a piece of informa-
tion, is needed for that information to be conscious. Indeed,meta-
cognition, or the ability to reflect upon thoughts and draw judge-
ments upon them, is often proposed as a crucial ingredient of
consciousness (Cleeremans et al., 2007; Lau, 2008) (although
see Kanai et al., 2010, for evidence that metacognitive judge-
ments can occur without conscious perception). In humans, as
opposed to other animals, consciousness may also involve the
construction of a verbal narrative of the reasons for our behavior
(Gazzaniga et al., 1977). Although this narrative can be fictitious
(Wegner, 2003), it would be indispensable to interindividual
communication (Bahrami et al., 2010; Frith, 2007).
Metacognition and self-representation have only recently
begun to be studied behaviorally with paradigms simple enough
to extend to nonhuman species (Kiani andShadlen, 2009; Terrace
and Son, 2009) and to be related to specific brainmeasurements,
notably anterior prefrontal cortex (Fleming et al., 2010). Thus, our
view is that these concepts, although essential, have not yet
Neuron
Reviewreceivedasufficient empirical andneurophysiological definition to
figure in this review. FollowingCrick and Koch (1990), we focused
solely here on the simpler and well-studied question of what
neurophysiological mechanisms differentiate conscious access
to some information from nonconscious processing of the same
information. Additional work will be needed to explore, in the
future, these important aspects of higher-order consciousness.
In the present state of investigations, experimental measures
of conscious access identified in this review include: (1) sudden,
all-or-none ignition of prefronto-parietal networks; (2) concomi-
tant all-or-none amplification of sensory activation; (3) a late
global P3b wave in event-related potentials; (4) late amplification
of broad-band power in the gamma range; (5) enhanced long-
distance phase synchronization, particularly in the beta range;
and (6) enhanced causal relations between distant areas,
including a significant top-down component. Many of these
measures are also found during complex serial computations
and in spontaneous thought. There is evidence that they rely
on an anatomical network of long-distance connections that is
particularly developed in the human brain. Finally, pathologies
of these networks or their long-distance connections are associ-
ated with impairments of conscious access.
In the future, as argued by Haynes (2009), the mapping of
conscious experiences onto neural states will ultimately require
not only a neural distinction between seen and not-seen trials,
but also a proof that the proposed conscious neural state actu-
ally encodes all the details of the participant’s current subjective
experience. Criteria for a genuine one-to-one mapping should
include verifying that the proposed neural state has the same
perceptual stability (for instance over successive eye move-
ments) and suffers from the same occasional illusions as the
subject’s own report. Multivariate decoding techniques provide
pertinent tools to address this question and have already been
used to infer conscious mental images from early visual areas
(Haynes andRees, 2005; Thirion et al., 2006) and from inferotem-
poral cortex (Schurger et al., 2010; Sterzer et al., 2008).
However, decoding the more intermingled neural patterns ex-
pected from PFC and other associative cortices is clearly a chal-
lenge for future research (though see Fuentemilla et al., 2010).
Another important question concerns the geneticmechanisms
that, in the coure of biological evolution, have led to the develop-
ment of the GNWarchitecture, particularly the relative expansion
of PFC, higher associative cortices, and their underlying long-
distance white matter tracts in the course of hominization (see
Avants et al., 2006; Schoenemann et al., 2005; Semendeferi
et al., 2002). Finally, now that measures of conscious processing
have been identified in human adults, it should become possible
to ask how they transpose to lower animal species (Changeux,
2006, 2010) and to human infants and fetuses (Dehaene-Lam-
bertz et al., 2002; Gelskov and Kouider, 2010; Lagercrantz and
Changeux, 2009), in whom genuine but immature long-distance
networks have been described (Fair et al., 2009; Fransson et al.,
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